As part of the latest research synthesis from the RECODE MLG project, we analyze the article co-authored by Philipp Trein, PhD, (University of Lausanne), Marian Marjanović, PhD and Yannis Papadopoulos, PhD. The authors examine the real potential, as well as the structural limitation of the co-creation process in multi-level governance.
Below are the 5 key takeaways, prepared by Dr. Philipp Trein, leader of WP2, Conceptual Development, regarding the institutional trade-offs and tensions shaping the future of collaborative governance:
- The horizontal dimension of MLG is underexplored. While multi-level governance research has thoroughly examined how the EU, national, regional, and local levels interact vertically, the inclusion of non-state actors and citizens across these levels has received far less attention. The paper sets out to remedy this gap by asking whether co-creation can make MLG both more effective and more legitimate.
- Scope and depth of coordination involve unavoidable trade-offs. Drawing on the policy coordination literature, the authors show that broadening the scope of actors involved increases inclusiveness but tends to make binding collective decisions harder to reach. Deeper coordination (genuine shared decision-making rather than mere consultation) can lead to shared decisions about harmonization of public policies, but this may reduce leeway for participating organization in applying them.
- Co-creation’s potential depends on jurisdictional type. In general-purpose (Type 1) jurisdictions, entrenched institutional structures, ministerial control, and competing policy priorities limit co-creation’s real influence — often raising expectations without changing outcomes. Task-specific (Type 2) jurisdictions, being more flexible and problem-oriented, offer more favorable conditions for genuine co-decision, though they suffer from lower visibility and weaker public accountability.
- Co-creation as “Polycentric democracy”. The authors introduce polycentric democracy as a hybrid model in which co-creation arenas and formal representative institutions coexist in “loose coupling.” It co-creation functions as a second-order democracy — problem-oriented, locally anchored, legitimized through collaborative problem-solving rather than electoral competition, and dependent on boundary-spanning brokers who connect jurisdictions.
- Four structural tensions constrain co-creation’s democratic promise. The paper warns against treating co-creation as a universal remedy. Four neglected tensions persist: implementation deficits, power asymmetries and strategic behavior, the trade-off between local sensitivity and standardized treatment of target populations, and the ambivalent effects of digitalization. A research agenda should treat co-creation as a contested, structured set of practices rather than an inherently democratizing tool.
